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　　When　Europeans　once　more　made　their　apPearance　on　the　shores　of　Japan，　the　Emperor
was　still　a　myth　in　their　eyes．　The　Shogun　was　the　de　facto　sovereign　with　whom　they　had
to　deal　and　as　far　as　they　knew，　in　their　ignorance　of　the　history　and　institution　of　Japan．
In　Perry’s　treaty，　he　was　described　as“the　August　Sovereign　of　Japan，”and　in　the　first
English　treaty　that　of　Admiral　Stirling　concluded　in　1854－as“His　Imperial　Highness，　the
Emperor，”in　Lord　Elgin’s　treaty　of　1858，　as“His　Majesty　the　Tycoon”and　in　the　Prussian
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treaty　of　l861，　as“Seine　Majestat　der　Taikun．”The　Shogun　apparently　retained　all　his
power　and　influence　and　the　country　was　governed　by　his　ministry　with　whom　alone　the
foreign　diplomats　had　any　direct　relations．　But　a　revolution　had　already　begun　which　was
destined　within　one　decade　to　destroy　utterly　the　political　fabric　that　had　lasted　for　more
than　seven　centuries　and　to　restore　to　the　legitimate　Emperor　all　the　excutive　functions
that　were　his　undoubted　constitutional　prerogative．
　　At　that　time，　there　was　no　choice　because　Japan　was　not　strong　enough　to　oppose　the
west，　but　many　in　Japan　refused　to　accept　this．　They　demand　that　foreigners　be　expelled
and　Japan　return　to　old　ways．　The　hidden　currents　already　breaking　up　Japanese　feudal
society　before　l853　now　came　to　the　surface．　Opposition　to　the　Bakufu　was　linked　with
hostility　to　the　foreigners　in　the　cry　of“j6i”（Honor　the　Emperor　and　expel　the　barbar－
ians）．
　　The　Bakufu　was　caught　in　a　trap　not　of　its　own　choosing　whichever　way　it　turned，　it
failed　to　satisfy　either　the　foreigners　pressing　it　from　one　side，　or　its　enemies　in　the
country．　Assassinations　were　frequent，　those　of　foreigners　being　a　particular　source　of
trouble．　Two　of　the　feudal　daimyo，　Satsuma　and　Ch6shU，　realized　the　hard　way　just　how
strong　the　foreigners　were，　but　while　that　modified　somewhat　their　anti－foreign　stance，　it
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did　nothing　to　change　their　attitude　towards　the　Bakufu．
　　By　the　time　the　Emperor　K6mei　died　in　1867，　the　Bakufu　was　manifestly　a　failure．　It　had
failed　to　punish　the　daimyo　of　Ch6shU　for　rebellion　and　was．under　strong　pressure　from
the　other　powerful　south－western　daimyo　to　abandon　the　attempt，　while　the　main　object
of　the　promoters　of　the　Restoration　was　the　destruction　of　the　Bakufu　and　revival　of　the
Imperial　regime，　they　had　utilised　by　the　cry　of“jδi，”in　order　to　cement　in　one　common
bond　of　union　all　the　fighting　force　of　the　Empire　no．t　bound　to　the　Tokugawa　cause　by
ties　of　consanguinity　or　material　interest．
　　AU　who　had　shared　the　anti－foreign　sentiment　and　had　fought　for　their　beliefs，　fondly
believed　that　the　moment　the　Emperor　regained　his　own　anti－foreign　campaign　would　be
at　once　instituted　under　the　Emperor’s　banner，　and　they　were　as　ready　to　give　their　swords
to　it　as　they　had　been　to　the　overthrow　of　the　Bakufu．　But　while　the　cry　of“j6i”had　been
openly　used　to　the　very　last，　so　long　as　the　Bakufu　was　a　power　to　be　feared，　a　change　had
during　the　last　years　of　the　struggle　taken　place　in　the　minds　of　the　leaders　of　the　moment．
　　The　tWo　most　powerful　daimyo（Satsuma　and　Ch6sha）who　took　active　part　in　it　had
received　severe　lessons　of　the　consequences　of　indulging　in　armed　resistance　to　European
powers．　They　now　believed　was　essential　to　the　future　integrity　and　progress　of　Japan．
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This　meant　a　complete　subversal　of　all　that　they　had　at　once　boldly　and　publicly　adopted．
　　When　these　daimyo　called　for　the　surrender　of　the　Bakufu’s　power，　it　looked　for　a　time
as　though　there　would　be　a　bloodless　change，　but　such　hopes　prove　short－lived．
　　In　January　1868，　the　Imperial　Palace　at　Kyoto　was　seized　and　a　decree　issued　stripping
the　Shogun　of　all　his　power；the　rule　of　the　Tokugawa　Bakufu　was　over．　Administrative
power　was　nominally　at　least，　restored　to　the　Emperor　一　hence　the“Meiji　Restoration’L，
and　though　the　Shogun　and　his　supporters　fought　back　for　another　eighteen　month，　a　new
order　had　begun．
1．Several　Approaches　to　the　Law　of　Nations
　　During　the　late　Bakufu　period，　generally　considered　a　time　of　confusion　about　Western
diplomacy．　The　initial　response　to　the“law　of　nations”was　to　ignore　it　whenever　possible，
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substituting　in　its　stead－tested　Japanese　style．　Perry　was　humiliated　as　a　barbarian
unworthy　of　notice．　Japanese　had　respect　only　for　Perry’s　cannon，　and　not　his　treaty．
Neverthless，　lofty　neglect　prove　more　and　more　an　unviable　policy　after　the　arrival　of
Townsend　Harris，　some　members　of　Bakufu　insisted　that　virtuous　and　friendly　nations
ought　to　treat　each　other　with　cordiality，　even　if　they　had　to　follow　a　Western　code　of
etiquette．　But　the　others　argued，　it　was　important　for　Shogunate　to　adopt　token　gestures
of　cordiality　in　negotiating　with　foreign　countries　friendly　to　Japan　and　respectful　of　its
ancient　laWS．
　　The　view　of　the“law　of　nations”as　an　etiquette　between　virtuous　equals　continued
through　the　late　of　Bakufu　embassys　into　the　early　Meiji　period．　Neverthless，　there　were
those　who　left　that　Japan　was　threatened　by　foreign　intercourse，　and　needed　a　shield
behind　which　to　build　up　its　military　might．
　　It　could　crystallize　the　experience　of　the　late　of　Bakufu　period　with　the　statement　that
“The　defense　of　a　country　lie　in　actual　power，　not　in　treaties．　When　the　first　treaties　on
the“law　of　nations”arrived　in　Japan，　this　dichoto　my　between　positive　and　natural　law
in　the　West，　therefore　it　is　not　surprising　that　readers　of　these　new　books　alligned
themselves　either　with　those　who　saw　the“law　of　nations”as　a　tool　of　strong，　or　with
those　who　adopt　it　as　a　form　of　gentlemanly　etiquette．
Neverthless，　Japanese　experiences　with　foreign　diplomacy　prior　to　the　arrival　of　Martin’s
book　had　set　up　the　rival　camps　of　the“law　of　nations”as　gentlemanly　etiquette　between
the　moral　being　of　states　or　as　a　tool　of　strength．　But　Japanese，　not　having　the　benefit　of
Martin’s　personal　appearance　to　explain　the　conundrums　in　Bankoku　K6ho，　were　occa－
SiOnally　let　intO　egregiOUS　errOrS．
　　One　translater　from　the　Martin’s　book　into　colloquial　Japanese，　Sigeno　Yasushi（yasut－
sugu），　parsed　Martin’s　description　of　Grotius　theories　thus：
　　In　short，　Hugo　Grotius’s　theory，　as　well　as　that　of　Menciu’s　discussion　of　nature　of　good，
and　Oy6mei’s　dictum，　all　say　that　according　to　the　Creator’s　directive　the　course　of　good
and　evil　actions　is　decided，　and　this　in　fine，　is　just　what　the　Christian’s　believe．
Wheaton’s“Elements　of　International　Law”could　be　all　this　to　Martin，　and　more　to　the
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Japanese，　due　to　the　unique　beliefs　of　its　author，　Martin　ideally　adopted　to　the　Chinese
intellect　as　he　said　in　the　English　preface　to“Wan－Kuo　Kun　fa”：
　　To　its（the　law　of　nations）fundamental　principle，　the　Chinese　mind　is　prepared　to　yield
aready　assent．　In　their　state　ritual　as　well　as　their　canonical　books，　they　acknowledge　a
supreme　arbiter　of　human　destiny，　to　whom　Kings　and　Princes　are　responsible　for　their
exercise　of　delegated　power：and　in　theory，．　no　people　are　more　ready　to　admit　that’?奄刀@law
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is　inscribed　on　the　human　heart．　The　relations　of　nations，　considered　as　a　moral　persons，
and　their　reciprocal　obligations　as　deduced　from　this　maxiM，．they’are　throughly　able　to
　　　　　　　　（3）
comprehend．
　　In　1868，　Santora　Uriu　published“K6d6kigen　or　Bankokukoho　zensho”（Corpus，　of　the
Origin　of　Common　Reason　or　the　Law　of　Nations℃omplete）．　In　the　preface，　he　wrote　that；
“Isought　to　end　the　confusi6n　caused　by　Martin’s　translation　of　Wheaton　by　summoning
the　original　book．　Despite　the　claims　of　this　translator　to　have　worked　from　an　English
edition　of　Wheaton，　though，　Uriu　seems　to　have　begun　his　labors　with　a　preconcetion　of
the“western　law　of　nations”as　a　way　of　moral　being，　and．　he　concluded　that　the　public
way　of　all　nations　and　a　scienCe　of　the　way　of　man　deduced　from　the　principle　of　the　way
of－Heaven．”
　　The　school　of　Okuni　Takamasa，　an　advisor　to　prince　Iwakura　on　Fukko　movement
（“Return　to　Antiquity），　was　particularly　vocal　in　reminding“joi”activist　of　their　first
principle．　Okuni　published“Shin　shin　KOh6　Ron”（on　the　new，　Real　Public　Law）in　1867，
he　pointed　in　its　berating　of　those　Japanese　who　clung　to　the　belief　that　all　nations　were
equal：
　　Great　Japan　is　the　heart　of　the　ten　thousand　lands　of　the　world，　and　our　Emperor　the
ruler　of　all　the　myriad　states　of　the　globe．　Although　there　has　been　a　public　order（kδh6）
beneath　Heaven　since　the　Age　of　the　Gods，　even　people　who　were　born　in　Greater　Japan
do　not　know　this，　so　of　course　men　born　in　other　lands　are　ignorant　of　it．……
　　The　Dutchman　Hugo　is　said　to　have　fostered　the　discipline　of　the　law　of　nations
（bankoku　k6hO），　but　this　is　not　so．　The　Chinese　have　a　public　order（kδhδ）of　Chinese　and
barbarians　under　the　son　of　Heaven………・The　teachers　of　this　public　order　went　through
China・In　1864　they　marked　up　a　book　called　Bonkoku　K6hδin　Chinese，　slapPed　it　on
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wood，　and　because　they　spread　it　all　over　the　worldi　it　spread　even　to　Japan．　In　1865　it　was
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　translated　and　printed，　for　everyone　to　read．
　　　In　an　elaborate　parable，　Okuni　spun　a　tale　of　a　man　of“low　statute　and　little　strength”
who　was　abused　by　a　huge，　brawny　foreigners．　Try　as　he　might，　the　little　man　could　not
perform　his　traditional，　peaceful　worship　of　the　gods，　since　the　way　to　the　local　shrine　was
blocked　by　foreigners．　As　a　follower　of　the　gods，　the　Iittle　man皿derstood　that　true
　strength　lay　in　virture．　Neverthless，　despondent　over　his　inability　to　oust　the　foreign　bully，
the　little　man　turned　to　conjuring　with　foreign　magic．　In　a　new　locale，（the　western　law　of
nations）the　downtrodden　Japanese　conjured　up　an　artificial　paradise．　Deluded　by　his
illusory　happiness，　the　little　man　forgot　the　way　of　the　Gods　and　prostrated　himself　at　the
false　shrine　of　western　ideas．　This　debased　condition，　Okuni　remonstrated，　is　not　the
、proper“new，　true　law　of　nations”．　Oppressed　Japanese　should　remember　that“the　new，
true　law　of　nations”is　the　way　of　the　Gods，　taught　by　the　Emperor．　He　is　the　Universal
　Lord（SOtei）：Japan　is　the　heartland　of　all　the　nations　of　the　world．
　　　Okuni　struck　out　at　those　Japanese　who　thought　that　the　glory　of　Imperial　Japan　might
be　preserved　through　some　foreign“law　of　nations”rather　than　through　a　devotion　to　the
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Emperor　and　Japanese　spirit．
These　writers，　the　theorists　of　the　Restoration　movement，　especially　Okuni　who　deplored
　an　eglistic　reading　of　the“law　of　nations”would　have　been　quick　to　censure　a　deviation
from　the　Imperial　way　by　their　loyalist　activist　compatriots．　Okuni　closes　his　diatribe　with
　the　precept　that　the“great　way”of　reason　is　to　reject　the　doctrine　that　Japan　is　equal　to
　other　nations，　Japan　is　superior，　and　follows　a“law　of　nations”all　its　own．　By　these
writers，　the“law　of　nations”might　seem　to　make　Japan　dn　equal　of　the　Western　powers，
but　peoples　like　Iwakura　and　others　insisted　that　only　Japanese　spirit　and　arms　could　help
greater　Japan　to　illuminate　the　way　of　the　Emperor，　and　surpass　all　the　nations　of　the
　world．
　　　The　later　and　more　accurate　description　of　the“law　of　nations”prodiXced　by　three　of　the
Bakufu’s　foreign　students（Nishi　Amane，　Tsuda　Mamichi，　Enomoto　Takeaki）turned
Okuni’s　imagined　mob　of　egalitarian　into　horde．
In　June　1863，　seven　Japanese　foreign　students　arrived　in　Rotterdam，　among　them，　Enomoto
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was　charged　with　learning　about　Western　naval　operations　and　maritime　law．　Nishi　and
Tsuda　explained　to　their　host：“We　know　nothing　at　all　of　the　requisite　knowledge　for
carring　on　relations　with　the　various　states　of　Europe　and　for　reforming　oUr　domestic
administation　and　institutions，　nor　of　such　subjects　as　statistics，　law，　economics，　politics
and　diplomacy．“Accordingly，　Nishi　and　Tsuda　wished　to　have　a　crash　course　in　natural
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law，　the“law　of　nations”，　domestic　legal　systems，　economics，　statistiCs　and　philosophy．　ln
1868Nishi　published　a　Japanese　translqtion　of　Vissering　lectures　on　the“law　of　Nations”
dedicated　to　the　Shogun．　Book　1，　chapter　one　of　Nishi’s　treatise，“Bankoku　K6h6　no
taishi”（The　Leading　Tenets　of　the　Law　of　Nations）says：The　law　of　nations　is　a　part　of
jurisprudence　that　discusses　the　reciprocal　rightS　in　force　between　all　nations，　and　teaches
the　duty　of　acting　in　accordance　with　them．　The　word“nation”in　the“law　of　nations”
means　that　a　state　that　is　sovereign　and　independent　is　treated　as　self－determinating　and
belonging　to　no　other　party　in　its　worthy　intercourse．
　　And　in　the　next　chapter‘‘seih6　ni・motozuki　k6hδotatsuru　o　ronzu”（that　the　law　of
nati6ns　is　a　thing　based　on　natural　law），　he　discussed　the　origin　and　nature　of　the　right　by
the“law　of　nations”，　and　said　there　are　two　rights　under　natural　law，　natural　rights　based
on　external　principles　above　man’s　existence，　and　provisional　rights．　This　priori　natural
right　under　the　law　of　nations　may　be　more　precisely　divided　into　three　parts：a）the　right
to　defence，　b）the　right　to　independence，　c）the　right　to　exploit　domestic　resources．
This　section　of　Nihi’s　work　seems　to　provides　evidence　of　influence　of　vissering’s　cham－
pionship　of　the　natural　right　of　man　and　his　legal　reasoning．　It　also　went　far　in　making　him
one　of　the　first　m6n　to　be　selected　by　the　Meiji　government　to　take　charge　of　treaty
rev1Slon．
　　The　thought　that　a110wed　the　Japanese　to　expand　the“Western　law　of　nations”into　a
synonym　for　traditional　etiquetto　and　probity　is　excellently　illustrated　in　the　following
works　by　Nakamura　and　prior　to　his　1870　publication　of　Samuel　Smile’s“Self－help”as
“Saikoku　risshihen”・（Tales　of　success　in　the　West）．　Nakamura　had　fallen　under　the
influence　of　both　English　liberalism　and　Christian　ethics．　As　a　Japanese　by　birth　and　a
confucian　by　avocation，　Nakamura　made　his　book　a　best－seller　by　examining　national
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success　in　a　way　that　seemed　laudable　to　ex－shishi．
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　　In　1876　Nakamura　wrote　a　preface　to　a　commentary　on　Martin’s　Wan　Ku　Kung－fa　by
one　Takaya　Ryush亘，　The　title　of　Takaya’s　work，“Bankuku　Koho　reikan，”shows　that
both　Takaya　and　Nakamura　approached　the“Law　of　Nations”with　the　reverence
reserved　for　the　great　ethical　principles　of　the　Chinese　classics．　Reikan　is　an　acronym　for
aphrase　meaning　to“to　scrutinize　the　heavens』through　a　bamboo　tube：to　measure　the　sea
with　a　gourd”．　Like　the　Saikoku　risshihen，　Nakamura’s　preface　to　this　book　quotes　the
Chinese　confucian　Analects（Daigaku→The　Great　Learning）．
　　In　fine，　if　a　household　has　law，　then　it　is　well　managed．　If　a　nation　has　law，　then　it　has
enlightened　government、　If　all　nations（bankoku）have　law，　would　they　not　have　an
international　peaceful　administration？……the　study　of　this　law　of　nations　is　a　means　for
adding，　day　and　night，　to　the　goodness　and　completion　of　our　spirits，　which　will　finally
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lead　us　toward　a　state　of　beauty、and　happiness　that　will　be　like　a　paradise　on　earth．
　　To　be　sure，　Nakamura’s　preface　follow　the　introduction　of　Martin’s　Wan　Ku　Kun　fa
（Bankoku　k6h6）into　Japan　by　several　years，　but　with　the　process　of　analogy　firmly
established　by　Nakamura，　it　is　possible　to　examine　earlier　student　of　the“law　of　nations”
who　revealed　less　of　their　thinking．　One　of　such　students　was　Uriu　Mitora、
　　Naturally　enough，　the　way　of　nations　as　way　of　man　thesis　was　given　wide　credence．
Tokugawa　Yoshinobu（the　latest　shogun　bakufu）felt　that　a　cultivation　of　virtue　would
bring　Japan　to　world　prominence．　Yoshinobu　declared　in　a　manifesto　to　his　adherents，　in
which　he　stated　tha七：
　　It　appears　to　me　the　law　cannot　be　maintained　in　the　face　of　the　daily　extension　of　our
　　foreign　relations，　unless　the　goverment　is　conducted　by　one　head，　and　I　propose　there’
　　fore　to　surrender　the　whole　governing　power　into　the　hands　of　the　Imperial　court．
　　This　was　followed　by　the　formal　tender　of　his　resignation，　which　declared　on　g　Decem－
　ber　1867，“……if　the　Empire　be　protected　with　united　hearts　and　combined　efforts，　our
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　　country　will　hold　its　own　with　all　the　nation　of　the　world”．
　　Many　of　his　followers，　however，　refused　to　acquiesce　in　the　transfer　of　the　executive
power，　and　civil　war　continued　for　a　time；but　the　Mikado　was　in　the　end　completely
triumphant．　After　the　resignation　of　the　shogun　and　restoration　of　peace，　The　Mikado　as
Emperor　in　1868　took　what　is　sometimes　called　the“Charter　Oath”notified　that：
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　　“All　narrow　custOms　of　the　past　shall　be　abolished，　and　conduct　shall　be　based　on　the
international　way”．　It　was　the　promise　giving　his　people　a　deliberative　assembly，　to　rule
justly，　and“to　seek　for　wisdom　in　all　quarters　of　the　world”．　One　further　translation　of
Wheaton，　deserves　mention．　In　1868　Tsutsumi　Koshiji（Teigaishishi）published　a　work
entitled“Bankoku　K6h6　Shakugi”（yakugi）（The　meaning　of　interpreted）probably　em・
ploying　both　English　original　and　Martin’s　version．　Tsutsumi　was　interested　in　the“law
of　nations”for　more　than　its　potential　as　westernized　version　of　the　Great　Learning．　He
took　every　opportunity　to　prove　its　use　to　a　Japan　suffering　under　the　demands　of　foreign
nations．　Thus，　in　translating　Wheaton’s　mention　of　the　opinion　that　the“law　of　nations”
is“The　sole　law　of　those　who　are　not　regulated　by　other　law”，　Tsutsumi　says“A　free
country　uses　this　law　in　order　not　to　give　into　another　co皿try”．　This　is　the　core　of　the　law
of　nations．　His　accurate　translation　of　Wheation’s　discussion　of　tributary　and　vassal
states，　and　Wheaton’s　summary　of　consular　jurisdiction　is　Turkey，　Barbary　and　China
could　have　bolstered　arguments　for　using　the“law　of　nations”as　a　shield　against　Western
oppression．　Writing　in　1868，　Tsutsumi　must　have　welcomed　the　chance　to　put　Wheaton’s
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comments　on　treaty　revision　into　Japan．
　
2 The　Meiji’foverment　and　International　Law
　　On　January　15，1868，　the　Meiji　government　issued　a　statement　as　follows：Since　the
failure　of　foreign　policy　in　the　transitional　period　from　Edo　to　Meiji，　it　has　been　hard　for
our　Emperor　to　accept　the　rules　governing　relations　between　nations．　It　has　also　been
strenuous　for　Japanese　subjects　themselves　to　get　used　to　reformation　in　Japan．　So　we　will
propose　amendment　to　the　present　restrictive　treaty　at　the　intergovernmental　meetings．
After　the　conclusion　of　the　revised　treaty　with　other　states，　we　will　be　able　to　purge
subject’s　distrust　for　our　politics　and　strengthen　our　army……．　But　when　we　determine　to
change　the　promise　with　foreign　states　the　measures　to　be　taken　will　be　decided　in　the
public　debate　with　other　states．　The　rule　for　relations　between　nations　is　viewd　as　public
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regulating　our　state．　We　should　be　aware　of　this．
　　On　the　8th　of　February，1868，　a　nobleman　of　high　rank　in　the　court　delivered　to　the
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　　diplomatic　representatives　of　the　foreign　powers　a　formal　documents　bearing“the　Seal
　　of　Great　Japan”for　transmission　to　their　governments，　in　which　the　Emperor　announced
　　his　intention　of　thence－forward　exercising　supreme　authority　both　in　the　internal　and
　　external　affairs　of　the　co皿try　and　of　substituting　in　the　treaties　his　own　title　for　that
　　of　the　Tycoon．
　　It　was　claimed　that“intercourse　with　foreign　countries　shall　be　in　future　be　carried　on
in　accordance　with　the‘‘public　law　of　the　whole　world”，　and，　as　a　first　onward　step　on　this
path，　an　invitation　soon　followed　to　the　representatives　to　visit　Kyoto　and　be　received　in
audience　by　His　Majesty．
　　Now，　the　foreigners，　who　a　very　few　years　before　had　been　publicly　designated　by　the
late　Emperor（Komei）as“Sea　pirates”，“Ugly　barbarian”，　and“Foul　beasts”were　to　be
received　in　person　by　the　direct　decendant　of　the　God　of　Heaven．　But　the　ceremony　was
destined　not　to　pass　without　its　tragedy　one　of　the　many　which　darkened　those　days　of
foreign　intercourse　with　Japan．　And　foreign　merchants　were　confused　by　what　was
happening　in　Japan；they　knew　the　Shogunate，　but　did　not　know　the　new　government，
except　to　remember　that　the　cry“Honor　the　Emperor！”had　gone　with　the　cry“Expel　the
barbarian”．　It　was　not　surprising，　therefore，　that　if　they　supported　anybody，　they　support－
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（14）　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　’
ed　the　Shogun’s　party．
　　When　Sir　Harry　Parkes，　the　British　representative，　who　had　been　the　first　among　his
colleagues　to　recognize　the　new　government　and　to　give　it　his　strong　moral　support，　was
on　his　way　to　the　Palace，　two　fanatics，　maddened　at　the　desecration　of　the　Emperor　and
of　the　city，　suddenly　attacked　his　English　escort　and　inflicted　severe　wounds　on　ten　of　the
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men　composing　it　before　they　were　themselves　killed　or　disabled．
　　After　few　days，　An　lmperial　rescript　was　issued；
Ordering　the　nation，　to　obey　His　Majesty’s　will　in　the　fulfilment　of　the　treaties　with
foreign　countries　in　accordance　with　the　rule　of　lnternational　law，　all　persons　in　future
guilty　of　murdering　foreigners　or　of　committing　acts　of　violence　towards　them　will　be
actlng　ln　opposition　to　His　Majesty’s　expressed　orders　and　be　the　cause　of　national
misfortune．　They　will　therefore　be　punished　in　proportion　to　the　gravity　of　their　offence，
and　their　names，　if　samurai（soldier），　will　be　erased　from　roll．
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　　And　on　Feburary　140f　the　same　year，　Higashikuze，　Daigo　Dainagon，　who　is　a　governor
－general　of　Osaka　trial，　and　Date，　who　is　a　governor－general　of　hygo　trial　met　with
consuls　in　France，　the　United　Kingdom，　Italy，　Prusia，　Holland，　and　the　U．　S．　at　Nishi
Hongan　temple　in　Osaka．　Such　a　situation　surprised　authorities　who　had　the　power　to
control　the　state　of　the　nation　because　people　thought　that　Japan　followed　the　policy　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（16）exclusion　of　foreigners　and　would　not　associate　with　them．
　　After　this　meeting，　the　Meiji　government　issued　a　proclamation　about　the　conference　of
consuls　of　each　state．“The　Emperor　told　us　a　few　days　ago　according　to　the　rule
governing　relations　beween　nations　we　should　treat　consuls　of　every　state　gently　as　other
nations　do．　But　because　our　general　had　a　plan　to　travel　in　a　few　days　and　he　would　not
be　able　to　meet　with　them　some　other　day，　we　called　for　them　to　visit　us　before　the
scheduled　time．　Moreover，　the　Meiji　government　announced　another　proclamation　in　a
long　statement　on　the　same　day．
　　“We　once　failed　in　foreign　policy　and　concluded　the　restrictive　treaty　with　other　states．
But　we　may　amend　the　clauses　with　its　own　interest　after　we　announce　the　change　to　the
Japanese　cabinet，　even　though　almost　all　the　clauses　cannot　be　changed　without　good
reason．　But　if　we　amend　the　clauses　at　the　cabinet，　we　will　lose　their　confidence　in　us．
Therefore，　we　will　enter　into　other　treaty　based　on　the　principle　of　the　sovereign　equality
with　other　States．　It　is　our　duty　to　take　into　consideration　our　national　policy　and　adjust
our　national　policy　and　common　law　of　all　nations．　So　when　representatives　from　our　new
government　attend　the　conference，　we　will　propose　concluding　a　new　treaty．　Our　new
government　has　been　faced　with　important　duties　under　common　law　of　all　nations
although　we　are　inexperienced．　When　we　are　confronted　with　troubles　which　we　camot
solve　ourselves，　public　opinion　in　our　nation　will　help　us　find　a　solution”．（Dajokan　Niishi）
　　Even　though　the　Japanese　government　announced　these　proclamations，　the　restlessness
of　the　people　in　Japan　could　not　be　assuaged．　So　the　government　issued　another　statement
on　March　15th．　It　said，
　　“Arrangements　with　foreign　states　must　be　decided　in　accordance　with　the　principle　of
common　Iaw　of　all　nations　at　the　intergovernmental　conference　while　our　government
considers　ensuring　benefits　resulting　from　the　arrangements．　So　subjects　must　take　into
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account　the　laborious　task　of　our　government．　And　subjects　must　stop　committing
misdeeds，　or　murdering　foreigners．
　　In　addition，　the　government　ordered　subjects　to　respect　the　Imperial　court　and　stop　anti－
foreign　ideas　in　an　Instruction　of　Kyoto　governor．　It　said，
　　“It　is　unwise　to　make　a　suprise　attack　on　an　innocent　state　from　a　moral　point　of　view，
even　if　our　s’狽≠狽?@could　defeat　that　state．　If　our　state　takes　such　an　action　against　other
states，　we　will　lose　their　trust　and　be　unable　to　conclude　the　new　treaty　based　on　the
principle　of　sovereign　equality．　On　the　other　hand，　if　our　state　is　attacked　by　foreign　states
we　must　take　revenge　on　the　states　and　show　them　our　national　power　although　it　is
regretful　for　us　to　take　such　an　action．　But　if　subjects　don’t　cooperate　with　us　to　accom－
plish　our　policy，　we　will　not　be　able　to　have　good　relations　with　other　states．”
　　In　this　way，　the　new　government　had　a　policy　which　emphasized　cooperation　of　the
government　and　the　subjects　to　achieve　the　national　goal．　Furthermore，　the　government
emphasized　that　they　should　revise　the　restrictive　treaty　based　on　the　sovereign　inequality，
enter　into　a　new　treaty　instead　of　the　present　treaty，　and　remove“some　disadvantage”
from　relations　with　foreigh　countries．　But　they　didn’t　indicate　concretely　what“some
disadvantage”was，　what　clause　in　the　treaty　they　should　improve，　and　what“the　failure
of　foreign　policy　in　the　transition　period”was．（Is　the　answer　that　Japan　opened　a　country
to　diplomatic　relations？）It　seems　to　me　that　the　people　in　charge　of　diplomacy　in　the　new
Meijigovernment　didn’t　have　as　much　knowledge　to　handle　foreign　diplomacy　as　those　in
Edo　shogunate　had．　Because　all　the　statements　as　noted　above　are　too　vague　and　make　it
hard　to　understand　for　what　reason　the　government　wanted　to　improve“some　disadvan－
tage”in　the　restrictive　treaty．　And　while　the　government　said　that　it　should　change　the
treaty　based　on　inequality，　it　concluded　a　more　restrictive　treaty　against　other　states．　The
purpose　of　having　issued　the　statements　was　just　to　assuage　the　subjects　in　confusion．
　　In　addition，　their　lack　of　ability　in　foreign　diplomacy　was　proven　more　clear　by　the
negotiation　of　treaty　with　Habsburg　in　Holland　on　Feburary　6，1868．
　　While　the　draft　of　the　treaty　proposed　by　Habsburg　contained　the　same　contents　as　the
restrictive　one　concluded　with　other　states　before，　the　demand　of　the　Japanese　government
was　not　that　Japan　should　take　responsible　for　all　jurisdiction　in　its　own　territory，　but　that
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all　of　the　foreign　consuls　should　be　official　consul，　the　salary　of　whom　is　paid　commensu－
rate　with　his　duty．　Japan　didn’t　deal　with　the　unbalanced　tariff　agreement　and　most
－favored－nation　treaty　as　well．　So　it　is　clear　that　the　government　didn’t　know　that　a
sovereign　state　must　have　the　right　of　tariff　autonomy　to　ensure　the　principle　of　sovereign
equality．
　　Moreover，　Japan　agreed　to　three　agreements　which　demanded　that　Japan　yield　the　right
of　its　jurisdiction　to　other　states　in　dealing　with　civil　affairs　in　Japan．　Specifically　Japan
admitted　mixed　trials　with　Spain　in　January，1868，　the　trading　right　around　the　Japan
coast　with　Germany　and　not　attending　trials　in　dealing　with　civil　cases　of　Germans　in
Japan，　and　opening　a　port　in　Yokohama　and　entering　into　the　commercial　treaty　with
Austria－Hungary，　which　was　more　of　a　disadvantage　than　ever　before．
　　On　the　other　hand，　it　is　possible　to　think　that　the　reason　why　the　new　Japanese
government　entered　into　the　unbalanced　treaty　without　the　consideration　of　its　own
advantage　was　that　Japan　had　to　avoid　any　doubt　about　the　revival　of　the　anti－foreign
system．　It　was　hard　for　the　Meiji　government　to　change　the　restrictive　treaty　not　because
of　the　commercial　treaty　concluded　at　the　time　of　the　Bakumatsu　period　but　because　of　the
lgnorance　concerning　foreign　policy．
　　There　is　evidence　at　that　time　that　the　Meiji　government　made　all　experienced　officials
in　the　Bakumatsu　period　resign．　If　so，　the　the　other　question　of　whether　or　not　the　Meiji
government　was　a　reformist　group　for　international　relations　arises　because　the　new
government　should　have　referred　to　the　process　and　technique　of　diplomatic　negotiation
of　the　shogunate　if　the・government　wanted　to　improve　the　status　in　the　international
community　and　calm　down　the　confused　domestic　affairs．　Judging　from　this，　it　seems　to
me　that　the　reformation　called　Meiji　Ishin　was　not　for　all　the　subjects，　but　only　for　the
officials　of　the　new　government．
　　After　all，　there　are　two　reasons　why　such　a　failure　of　the　diplomatic　negotiations
occured．　First，　the　officials　in　the　new　Meiji　government　were　ignorant　of　international
law　although　Japan　was　part　of　the　international　community　at　that　time．　Second，　because
the　domestic　affairs　in　Japan　were　unstable，　Japan　had　to　tackle　these　problems　first．　So
Japan　was　not　experienced　enough　to　negotiate　international　affairs　as　one　of　the　states
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皿der　international　law．
　　It　is　useful　to　compare　four　cases　which　occured　in　Japan　to　show　the　difference　between
Japan　and　other　states．　One　case　was　tried　in　a　court　of　justice　of　the　U・S・in　Japan・And
the　other　cases　in　which　Japanese　injured　some　foreigners　in　Japan　was　treated　in　a　court
of　Japan．　The　former　was　the　Pauru　Masuko　case　in　September　of　the　first　year　of　Meiji．
The　court　of　justice　of　the　U．　S．　in　Japan　passed　judgement　that　the　defendant　was　called
for　to　be　expelled　from　Japan　after　he　was　sentenced　to　one　and　a　half　year’s　imprison－
ment．　The　latter　was　as　follows．　The　prosecutors　in　courts　of　Japan　falsified　the　evidence
through　torturing　and　threatening　the　defendants．　And　the　judges　decided　the　punishment
of　the　defendants　at　Judge’s　discretion　and　inflicted　severe　penalties　against　them　The
defendants　in　these　cases　were　called　to　perform　hara－kiri，　and　the　Japanese　government
apologized　to　the　victim’s　states　for　the　cases．　The　government　took　actions　in　these　ways
to　solve　the　problems．
　　The　judicial　system　in　Japan　was　extremely　different　from　that　of　other　states．　So　it　is
clear　why　foreign　states　could　not　accept　the　proposals　from　Japanese　government　to
change　the　restrictive　treaty　into　a　balanced　treaty　based　on　the　sovereign　equality．　And
it　was　proper　for　foreign　states　to　propose　charging　the　anti－alien　policy　in　Japan．
3．Statesmen　in　tlle　Early　Meiji　Period　and　Internatioanl　Law
　　This　chapter　is　an　overview　of　the　essential　ways　in　which　statesmen　in　the　early　Meiji
government　viewed　international　law．
　　Since　Perry，　some　Japanese　had　regarded　international　law　that　authorized　the　actions
of　foreign　gunboats　policy．
　　Kido　K6in，　one　of　the　elder　statesmen　in　the　Meiji　period，　stated：“When　the　military
power　of　the　West　becomes　weaker　than　that　of　Japan　the　validity　of　common　law　of　all
nations　will　decrease．　The　West　may　exploit　international　law　to　supplement　their
weaknesses．　In　other　words，　the　common　law　is　the　law　which　deprives　the　less　developed
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states　of　their　rights　in　the　international　community．”（on　November　8，1868）
　　Iwakura　Tomomi　also　complained　about　the　international　law　in　Feburary　l869　as
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follows．“We　cannot　attain　equality　through　intergovernmental　conference　under　the
internatiOnal　laW．
　　Therefore　so　we　will　not　consider　the　law　as　the　precedent．　Japan　cannot　have　the
confidence　in　the　law．　Therefore，　a　Japanese　who　supports　the　common　law　will　be
thought　of　as　Europeanized．
　　On　the　other　hand，　other　statesmen　were　in　favor　of　the　common　law　of　all　nations．　One
said，“We　cannot　trust　other　countries　and　international　law　because　the　European　states
sometimes　exploit　it　for　their　own　advantage　in　the　international　community．　But　even　if
European　states，　in　some　cases，　conduct　diplomacy　in　their　own　interests，　we　will　cooper－
ate　with　them．　Governments　usually　base　their　diplomacy　on　reason　and　good　faith．　If
these　governments　behave　kindly，　they　will　not　discriminate　against　developing　countries．
So　we　will　not　come　back　to　the　closed－door　policy．　And　we　will　continue　to　open　a　port
’to　foreign　ships　for　trade”．
　　And　this　statement　continued　to　reproach　the　policy　of　the　Tokugawa　shogunate．“The
shogunate　deserves　to　be　blamed　for　the　failure　of　diplomacy　in　the　Bakumatsu　period．
Because　they　concluded　the　treaty　without　consideration　of　our　own　advantage　after　the
cQnferences　were　held　only　three　or　four　times，　while　foreign　states　pressured　Japan　to
make　a　treaty．　So　we　must　have　set　up　a　new　diplomatic　policy　to　rectify　the　failure　in　the
Bakumatsu　period　and　try　foreign　servicemen　in　Japanese　courts．”
　　We　can　imply　two　facts　from　such　statements．　First，　the　Japanese　officials　didn’t　know
the　rights　under　international　law　not　to　be　able　to　try　foreign　servicemen　in　Japanese
courts．　Second，　it　seems　that　the　Japanese　officials　didn’t　recognize　that　reports　to　the
Emperor　were　contradictory　to　those　for　the　subject．　The　Meiji　government　considered
that　international　law　was　surely　the　commercial　treaty　itself，　and　they　didn’t　know
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international　law　did　not　apPly　only　to　trade．（So　such　contradiction　accured．）
　　We　can　recognize　from　the　follwing　report　that　Ito　Hirobumi　thought　international　law
apPlied　to　European　diplomacy．　It　said，“We　can’t　trade　without　revising　the　present
treaty．………The　European　is　afraid　of　the　anti－alien　policy　in　Japan　so　they　forced　us　to
amend　the　policy　and　advocated　the　importance　of　common　law　of　all　nations．”（January，
　（19）
1872）
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　　To　the　contrary，　other　two　statements　prove　that　the　Iwakura　mission　to　Europe　didn’t
have　enough　knowledge　about　international　law．　First，　the　report　of　the　investigation　of
the　mission　said，“We　were　advised　by　the　U．　S．　consul　about　another　requirements　for
changing　the　treaty．”The　mission　learned　from　the　U．　S．　consul　that　a　full　power　of
attorney　was　required　to　revise　the　treaty　when　they　proposed　changing　the　restrictive
treaty．　We　can　imply　from　the　report　that　the　missions　didn’t　know　the　necessary　require－
ment　to　amend　the　treaty　under　international　law．　Second，　an　official　document　prepared
by　General　Yamada　Akiyoshi，　who　was　a　member　of　the　missions，　says　that“if　we　follow
the　common　law　of　all　nations　based　on　the　universal　moral　we　must　build　up　our　military
force　to　fight　well　with　the　British　or　U．　S．　navies　and　the　armies　of　Prussia　or　France．
And　our　modernization　will　be　achieved　as　soon　as　possible　when　we　strengthen　our
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military　under　the　common　law　of　all　nations”．　We　can　understand　the　indication　that　the
military　build　up　was　required　to　compete　on　equal　terms　with　European　states．　But　it　is
incomprehensible　how　the　build　up　could　be　achieved　under　the　common　law　of　all　nations．
　　Iwakura　Tomomi，　who　was　one　of　the　leading　figures　in　diplOmacy　in　the　early　Meiji
period，　commented　not　about　the　disadvantage　of　consular　jurisdiction，　but　about　the
neutrality　in　time　of　war，　and　education，　in　a　report　to　the　Emperor　as　follows．“The
jurisdiction　which　foreign　consuls　have　in　Japan　should　be　respected　by　Japanese　courts．
And　the　courts　should　treat　the　origin　of　the　law　of　each　country　prior　to　the　Japanese　law
when　some　foreigners　bring　a　case　before　the　court　in　Japan．”He、also　suggested　that
education　be　given　to　cope　effectively　with　foreign　diplomacy　and　for　Japan　to　remain
neutral　in　time　of　war．　It　said，”The　Japanese　government．should　maintain　absolute
neutrality　in　the　time　of　war．　So　we　must　respect　the　treaty　about　the　neutrality　under
common　law　of　all　nations　for　that　purpose．　But　the　Japanese　government　doesn’t　have
enough　force　to　protect　Japan　against　foreign　military　forces　if　war　spreads　to　our
territory．”This　statement　about　neutrality　is　attributed　to　the　experience　of　the　war
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between　Prussia　and　France　in　the　1870．　Anyway，　the　report　didn’t　mention　about　limited
sovereignty　such　as　disadvantage　of　consular　jurisdiction　and　tariff　auto㎡omy．　We　can
imply　from　the　report　that　the　purpose　of　Iwakura　missions　to　Europe　was　not　to　revise
the’treaty，　but　to　research　the　domestic　administration，　the　domestic　law，　and　foreign
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diplomacy　in　Europe　to　allow　Japan　to　remain　independent．
　　As　noted　above，　Japanese　statesmen　used　the　common　law　of　．all　nations　to　carry　out　the
policy　which　emphasized　cooperation　of　the　government　and　the　subjects　to　achieve
national　goal　in　Japan．　They　just　regarded　the　common　law　as　applying　to　European
nations，　and　had　difficulties　with　international　affairs、　Some　letters　show　the　difficulties．
“We　are　reluctant　to　take　responsibility　in　international　affairs．　But　it　is　too　late　now　for
us　to　defy　the　other　states．　We　cannot　escape　responsibility．　Therefore，　we　intend　to　fulfill
the　task　with　impudence．”（a　report　from　the　ambassador　Iwakura　to　minister　Sanjo　Daj　o
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（22）
on　Feburary　9，1873）．“After　Westernization　was　spread　over　Japan，　Japanese　learned
foresight　and　wisdom　from　Europe，　so　they　became　inclined　to　make　profit　more　greedily
than　ever　before　even　if　commiting　a　crime．　Westernization　made　them　more　intelligent
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and　wicked．”（a　letter　from　Kido　K6in　to　Inoue　Kaoru　on　March　11，1873．）“Our　diplomacy
cannot　make　satisfactory　progress　by　calculating　how　much　we　will　take　advantages　and
adjusting　the　present　situation　because　the　capacity　of　Japanese　diplomacy　still　hasn’t
caught　up　with　that　of　the　other　states．”（a　letter　from　Ito　Hirobumi　to　Okuma　in　January，
（24）
1874）
－On　March　15，1874　the　members，　who　had　visited　Europe，　listened　to　some　ideas　from
Bismarck　about　international　law．　He　said，“In　today’s　world，　every　state　interacts　with
other　states　on　the　basis　of　friendship，　harmony，　and　protocoL　However，　this　is　merely
superficial　lip－service，　behind　which　lie　actual　practice．　Even　though　international　law　is
usually　said　to　be　the　law　to　preserve　the、right　which　every　state　has　as　a　sovereign　state
in　the　international　community，　big　powers　sometimes　exploit　international　law　for　profit
and　disregard　it　to　make　small　powers　obey　with　military　power　because　of　their　interests．
Small　powers　endeavour　to　keep　their　right　as　a　sovereign　state　with　the　cOnsideration
that　they　never　ignore　the　duty　in　the　international　community’and　violate　morality．　But
when　the　big　powers　strive　for　their　interests　the　small　powers　cannot　save　their　right　as
asovereign　state……．　Some　states，　specificially　Great　Britain　and　France　and　other　states
were　seizing　colonies，　using　their　resources，　and　increasing　their　power　shall　other　nations
watched　with　fear．　In　sum，　in　European　diplomacy，　trust　alone　is　not　sufficient．　Small
states　cannot　put　confidence　at　all　in　such　big　states・They　will　not　remove　the　distrust
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（25）
against　big　states　in　the　future”．
　　Bismark　evidently　struck　a　sympathtic　core　in　Kido．
　　Kido　responded　to　it　as　follows．“There　is　no　difference　between　people　in　Germany　and
Japan，　except　that　we　were　closed　countries　in　the　past，　and　there　was　not　enough　time　for
Japan　to　study　international　law　after　its　period　of　isolation．”Okubo’s　initial　view　of　the
“law　of　natiOns”was　as　ambigious　as　the　February　1868　proclamation．　By　1871，　however，
he　had　begun　to　see　glaring　inequalities　in　the　tariff　schedules　signed　in　accordance　with
the　principles　of　international　law．　He　complained　that　the　customs　regulations　gave
“rights　and　options　entirely　to　foreign　governments，　although　the　law　of　nations　holds　that
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（26）
they　ought　to　be　decided　in　a　conference　of　equal　nations．”Okubo　and　others　were　sure
that　their　early　view　of　the“law　of　nations”corresponded　to　conditions　in　the　West．　Both
Kido　and　Okubo　returned　home　immediately　after　Bismark’s　words　about　the　Western
“law　of　nations”still　ringing　in　their　ears．　In　addition，　his　other　comment　which　was
reported　to　Iwakura　shows　the　lack　of　knowledge　of　the　Japanese　officials　about　interna－
tional　law．　It　said，“Judging　from　our　observations　of　other　nations，　second　or　third　class
nations　have　prosperous　cultures，　to　say　nothing　of　big　power，　such　as　Great　Britain，　the
U．S．，　Germany，　and　France．　Japan　is　so　inferior　to　other　states　that　we　will　not　be　able
to　reach　their　level　even　if　we　learn　a　lot　from　them．　Consequently，　we　have　no　w4y　to　be
in　the　international　community　except　as　subordinate　to　the　West．”
　　Such　experience　in　Europe　taught　the　missions　that　international　law　applies　to　rela－
tions　between　civilized　nations　only．　In．April，18761wakura　mentioned　in　Japan’s　diplo－
macy　report　to　the　Emperor　that　the　restrictive　treaty　which　we　concluded　before　was　a
violation　of　the　principle　of　international　law　and　sovereignty．　It　said，“We　used　to　be
convinced　that　an　independent　state　can　stand　up　to　big　powers　if　it　is　prosperous．　But　it
was　not　true．　We　must　respect　the　association　with　foreign　countries　and　international　law
to　keep　the　peace　and　order　in　the　international　community．　That　is，　international　law　is
abasic　moral　principle　or　the　universal　validity　of　human　behavior……．　When　some　rival
states　stand　in　opposition　to　seek　their　interests　they　cannot　violate　the　coMmon　law　of　all
nations．　International　law　should　be　respected　as　well　as　national　law．　Thus，　a　sovereign
state　can　opt，　on　the　one　hand，　for　military，power　and　national　prosperity．　On　the　other
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hand，　a　nation－state　should　keep　the　principle　of　sovereign　equality　in　the　international
community……．　Big　powers　forced　us　to　conclude　the　unbalanced　treaty　which　was　the
violation　of　international　law　because　they　insisted　that　the　social　conditions　of　our　nation
were　unstable．　Even　though　there　is　big　difference　about　the　state　of　prosperity　of　each
nation　the　right　which　each　state　has　under　international　law　is　equal．　So　our　task　is　to
seek　the　domestic　and　international　affairs　in　good　condition．”
　　In　these　ways，　the　object　of　the　modernization　of　Japan　was　to　be　accepted　as　a
sovereign　state　under　international　law　after　the　legal　system　within　Japan　was　improved．
Ito　commented　severly　about　the　attitude　of　the　Japanese　government　toward　the　amend－
ment　of　the　restrictive　treaty．　It　said，“lt　is　inevitable　that　foreigners　in　Japan　didn’t
comply　with　our　domestic　law，　specifically　the．criminal　law　in　Japan，　because　the　law　was
not　suitable　for　treating　foreigners．　Since　the　Meiji　Restoration　we　have　treated　the　legal
systems　in　Western　countries　as　a　reference，　when　we　revised　the　national　law　in　Japan．
But　we　have　to　be　more　concerned　with　the　domestic　law　in　each　Western　country　if　we
wish　to　improve　our　politic　and』nation　for　subjects………It　goe．s　without　saying　that　the
growth　of　Japan　is　amazing，　compared　with　Japan’s　closed　door　policy　period．　But　the
growth　is　not　enough　at　all．　Our　object　is　to　be　on　a　par　with　the　civilized　nations　on　the
basis　of　Western　style．　Various　problems　will　lie　in　our　way．”（on　July　20，1888．）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Concluding　remarks
　　The　Japanese　have　been　blamed　for　their　lack　of　understanding　of　international　law　for
along　time．　One　reason　is　said　that　the　Japanese　have　not　tried　to　find　who　they　are．　In
other　words，　the　Japansese　have　not　struggled　to　be　effective　on　the　international　stage
through　consideration　of　the　origin　of　the　Japanese　culture　and　international　law　since　the
Meiji　government　had　accepted　the　international　norm　without　an　understanding　of
international　law　at　the　time　of　opening　to　foreign　intercourse．
　　To　be　sure，　until　the　first　half　of　the　Meiji　era　Japan　had　made　efforts　to　achieve　the
goal　of　her　modernization　through　its　own　methods　which　were　trying　to　just　accept　the
philosophy　of　Western　Europe　although　in　the　lack　of　thinking　of　general　principle　of
internatiOnal　COmmUnity．
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　　This　one－sided　method　was　also　used　to　develop　the　Japanese　economy　rapidly　after　the
Second　World　War．　But　through　the　process　of　economic　development，　Japan　has　ignored
political　accountabilities　required　in　the　international　community．　It　has　just　been　national
interests　that　have　dominated　over　the　will　of　people　in　Japan．　The　international　commu－
nity　has　a　rule　to　keep　international　balance．　It　has　strived　for　adjusting　various　types　of
policies　among　nations　without　discrimination　against　other　states．　But　the　Japanese
government　sometimes　didn’t　comply　with　the　rule：the　withdrawal　from　the　League　of
Nations，　World　War　II，and　Japan－US　security　treaty　are　but　a　few　examples．　Japanese
policies　show　us　through　history　that　we　must　have　imitated　the　lifestyle　of　other　states
to　advance　modernization．
　　That　is，　a　particular　way　to　create　a　new　life　has　been　just　to　subordinate　to　foreign
policies　under　pressure　from　the　international　community．　This　attitude　of　Japanese
government　toward　foreign　states　has　been　invariable　since　Meiji　Era．　Of　course，　Japan
has　ascended　to　the　richest　state　through　the　doctrine　of　economy　for　economy’s　sake
because　Japan　could　concentrate　on　only　her　economic　development　without　taking　care
of　political　issues　in　the　world．　But　now　many　states　and　peoples　around　the　world
criticize　Japan’s　foreign　policy，　including　economy　and　diplomacy，　for　its　incompetence．
What　is　the　reason　to　censure？　ls　the　reason　based　on　the　lack　of　a　cosmopolitan　outlook
and　understanding　of　international　law　by　the　Japanese？　If　the　reason　is　based　on
misleading　knowledge　of　the　outlook　and　understanding　like　the　statesmen　in　the　early
Meiji　period，　we　should　get　back　to　the　notion　of　what　the　Japanese　themselves　are．　And
instead　of　giving　priority　to　national　interests，　we　should　rethink　the　aim　of　Japan　under
the　international　community　from　the　very　beginning．　It　is　difficult　for　us　to　understand
the　reason　for　international　law　to　exist　without　rethinking　what　Japanese　are　while　we
prove　deeply　into　the　relationship　among　the　states．
　　One　must　recall，　in　addition，　for　all　the　interest　of　the　manoeuvres　that　took　place　during
the　early　1870’s，　the　diplomatic　issue　which　most　concerned　Japan　was　treaty　revision．　The
first　demand　for　treaty　revision　on　the　Japanese　side　was　voiced　almost　immediatly　after
the　Restoration．　An　almost　perennial　theme　of　diplomacy，　its　important　is　difficult　to
　　　　　　（27）
exaggerate．　From　the　Japanese　point　of　view　there　were　three　major　defects　in　the
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treaties，　and　these　were　of　sufficient　material　and　psychological　importance　to　justify
their　use　of　term“unequal”in　describing　them．　The　mOst　obvious　mark　of　inequality　was
the　fact　that　whereas　all　the　Western　countries　had　insisted　on　clauses　guarnteeing　most－
favoured－nation　treatment，　Japan　herself　possessed　no　such　safeguard，　and　provision
relating　to　her　rights　in　other　countries　were　mearge．　This，　however，　was　of　little　practical
importance　in　the　19th　century　and　was　no　more　than　a　nominal　objection　in　comparison
with　the　two　other　complaints．
　　The　one　which　was　voiced　most　in　the　earlier　period　of　treaty　revision　was　that　Japan
had　been　inequitably　deprived　of　tariff　autonomy．　By　the　1858　treaties　import　and　export
duties　had　been　fixed　for　the　duration　of　those　treaties．　Not　surprising　in　a　period　of
enthusiastic　free　trade　advocacy，　these　duties　were　made　fairly　low，　though　not　unreason－
ably　so，　but　the　Bakufu　had　bequeathed　to　Meiji　Japan　a　heavy　burden　by　agreeing，　in
l866，　to　a　new　tariff　convention　which　brought　almost　every　item　down　to　5％．　The
lowness　of　modern　industries　in　Japan，　and　from　the　late　1870’s，　when　protectionism
returned　to　Europe　in　full　force，　they　were　out　of　keeping　with　international　trends．
Neverthless，　although　from　the　early　1880’s　the　powers　were　prepared　to　allow　some
modification，　the　price　asked　in　return　was　so　high　that　Japan　was　forced　to　put　up　win
them　until　1899．
　　The　other　great　objection，　which　probably　ranked　most　deeply　of　all　with　the　Japanese，
and　which　dominated　treaty　revision　from　the　middle　1880’s，　related　to　the　Iegal　provisions
of　treaties．　These　had　established　the　bases　of　a　system　of　extraterritorial　jurisdiction，
similar　in　theory　to　that　which　had　been　granted　to　Europeans　by　the　Ottoman　Empires
from　a　position　of　strength　in　the　16th　century，　but　even　more　similar　to　that　which　had
been　in　China．　Under　extraterritoriality，　foreigners　were　not　subject　to　Japanese　jurisdic’
tion，　except　in　cases　where　they　brought　actions　against　Japanese，　and　in　practice　many
of　the　offences　committed　by　them　against　Japanese　law　went　unpunished　by　consular
courts．
　　In　the　conditions　of　l860’s　and　1870’s　the　system　was　accepted　by　most　thinking　Japanese
as　the　only　way　in　which　the　gulf　between　Japanese　and　Western　legal　standards　could　by
partially　bridged　but　with　the　drafting　a　Western－style　code　from　the　late　1870’s　onwards
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some　recognition　of　Japanese　progressiveness　was　expected　of　the　Western　powers．　When
this　was　not　forthcoming，　or　was　so　grudging　that　Japanese　attempt　to　make　something
of　it　had　to　hedged　in　with　very　substantial　conditions，　it　aroused　fierce　resentment　among
all　politically－conscious　Japanese．
　　As　a　good　deal　of　the　Japanese　opposition　to　the　treaties　was　due　to　the　way　in　which
clause　whose　drafting　lacked　precision　were　interpreted　by　the　powers．　At　the　early　time，
Japanese　government　was　obliged　to　accept　the　Western　view　that　the　most－favoured－
nation　right　was皿conditional　one，　which　entitled　any　power　to　claim　for　its　nationals　any
privilege　granted　to　another　power　wihtout　making　an　equivalent　concession．　More
important　than　this，　however，　was　the　fact　that，　because　of　her　weakness，　Japan　was
unable　to　resist　the　Western　interpretation　of　the　clause　relating　to　the　conditions　of
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revision．（Treaties　had　actually　be　revised　three　times　in　the　1860’s）
　　Since　by　accepting　and　seeking　modification　the　powers　had　accepted　the　principle　that
the　treaties　could　be　changed　by　mutual　consent　at　any　time，　the　inclusion　of　a　revision
clause　in　the　treaties　could　have　had　no　meaning　unless　it　signified　that　both　Japan　and
treaty　powers　were　entitled　from　l872　to　rescind　unilaterally　any　concession　granted　in
1858．Ithink　the　extreme　interpretation　of　the　revision　clause　also　gave　the　powers　the
right　to　ask　for　new　privileges，　and　the　standpoint　which　they　consistently　maintained
throughout　almost　the　whole　course　of　the　treaty　revision　negotiation，　was　that　no　change
could　be　made　without　their　consent．　The　unfortunate　corollary　of　this　for　Japan　was　that
the　powers　were　entitled　to　compensation　for　forgoing　their　rights，　and　they　were　not
disposed　to　sell　these　cheaply．　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（to　be　continued）
　　一Note－
（1）The　text　will　be　found　in　Beasley，　Select　documents　on　Japanese　foreign　policy，1853
　　－1868，（London，1955）．　Miyoshi　Masahiro，　International　Law　in　the　Modern　History　of
　　Japan，　Hohkei　Ronshu，　No．136（Dec．1994）．
（2）There　were　two　events：the　bombardment　of　Kagoshima　and　of　Shimonoseki，　the　first
　　by　British　fleet　in　1863　and　second　by　allied　fleets　of　Great　Britain，　France，　the　United
　　States　and　Holland　in　1865．　The　object　of　the　first　was　to　exact　reparation　for　the
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　　murder　of　a　British　subject　of　the　seco．nd　to　open　to　foreign　shipping　the　Strait　of
　　Shimonoseki　the　daimyo　had　determined　to　keep　closed．　Satsuma　and　Chosh亘were
　　powerful　daimyo　and　both　had　the　exclusionist　policy　through　from　different　motives，
　　Ch6shtt　being　a　sincere　advocate　of　it，　while　Satsuma　used　it　as　a　means　of　embarrasing
　　the　Bakufu．　Both　suffered　severely　in　the　defeat　of　the　flower　of　their　armies　by　the
　　allied　force（it　consisted　of　nine　British　ships　of　war，　four　Dutch，　three　French　and　one
　　United　States　chartered　steamer，　but　the　former　was　the　only　man－of　war　in　Japanese
　　waters）．　Both　might　be　recognize　Japan’s　military　impotency　against　great　powers　of
　　the　West，　and　learned　great　lessons　that　national　unity　was　essential　to　national　safty．
　　　　The　latter’s　attack　was　followed　by　a　demand　on　the　Shog皿ate　by　the　ministers　of
　　the　four　participating　powers　for　an　indemnity，　which　was　fix　at＄3million，　and　after
　　some　delay　and　great　embarrassment，　because　of　the　poverty　’of　the　treasury，　it　was
　　paid．　The　exaction　of　the　indemnity　under　the　circumstances　has　been　subject　of　much
　　adverse　criticism　The　attempt　to　close　the　port　was　in　violation　of　international　law；
　　but　it　was　not　the　act　of　the　government　with　which　the　powers　had　relations，　and　it
　　claimed　that，　if　time　was　afforded，　it　would　bring　about　the　removal　of　the　obstruction．
－The　sum　paid　to　the　United　States　remained　in　the　treasury　unused　for　twenty　years．
　　The　public　conscience　was　troubled　as　to　the　justness　of　the　exaction　and　in　1883　by　an
　　act　of　Congress　the　amount　received　was　returned　to　Japan，　and　accepted　by　that
　　government“as　a　strong　manifestation　of　that　spirit　of　justice　and　equity　which　has
　　always　animated　the　United　States　in　its　relations　with　Japan”．　None　of　the　other　three
　　nations　partaking　of　indemnity　have　seen　fit　to　follow　this　example．（U．　S　For．　Rel．1883，
　　60）．
（3）Martin，　English　preface　to　Wan－Kuo　Kung－fa，　quoted　in　immanuel　C．　Y．　HzU，　China’s
　　Entrance　into　the　Family　of　Nations（Harvard　1960），137．
　　　Shigeno　was　a　professor　of　Hongaku（Kagashima　clan），　and　Oy6mei’s　dictum　de．
　scribed　how　the　ancients　had　achieved　such　a　high　level　by　cultivating　personal　virtue
　　and　sense　of　duty；“Wishing　to　order　well　their　state，　they　first　regulated　their　families：
Wishing　to　regulate　their　families，　they　first　cultivated　their　persons：Wishing　to
　cultivate　their　person，　they　first　rectified　their　hearts．”
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　　　　　　　　State　Practices　and　Interpretation　of　International　Law　in　Early　Japan（1865－），　II
（4）The　text　used　is　in　Yoshino　Sakuz6，　ed．，　Meiji　bunka　zenshU，1927．　XV，170－183，　A　less
　　readable　text　is　in　Nomura　Denshiro，　Okuni　Takamasa　zenshU，1937，　III，211－36．　Minoru
　　Okada，　Okuni　Takamasa，1944，193－216．
（5）Another　of　Okuni’s　followers，　Hachida　Chiki，　discarded　his　teacher’s　lengthy　meta－
　　phors　in　his　Dairiron－ryaku（Outline　of　a　Theory　of　Great　Reason）．
　　　Hachida　defined　the“great　way”of　reason　as“the　will　of　gods”，　while　the“small
　　way”of　reason　was　found　in“the　assertions　of　foreign　natural　philosophers．”Such
　　“small　reason”had　produced“all　form　of　Western　barbarian　law”such　as　the　Law　of
　　Heaven（temp6），　Law　of　kings（oh6），　Natural　law（seihδ），　Law　of　reason（rih6）to　say
　　nothing　of　the　Law　of　Nations．　John　Peter　Stern，　The　Japanese　interpretation　of　the
　　“Law　of　Nations”1854－1874，74－75．
（6）　John　Peter　Stern，　ibid．，76．
（7）Sumiyoshi　Y．，　The　Japan’s　Failure　to　make　positive　use　of　international　law　in　Early
　　Meiji　Era，　Horitsu　Ronso（Meiji　Univ．），　vol．48，　No．2，18－19．
　　　Nishi　was　asked　by　the　Foreign　Ministry　to　work　on　treaty　revision　in　Feb．　1870，　but
　　the　Ministry　of　Army　refused　to　let　him　go．
（8）In　the　preface　Nakamura　states“the　purpose　of　this　book　was　for　the　shishi’s（Res－
　　troation　activist）goal　of　an　Imperial　Japan”that　was　outstanding　among　the　nations　of
　　the　world．　Unlike　the　shishi，　Nakamura　rejected　military　might　as　the　key　to　Japan’s
　　pushing　to　the　fore．　He　wrote　that　both　national　and　international　society　in　ordered　not
　　by　force，　but　by　virture，　though　which……the　nations　of　the　globe　come　together，
　　following　the　way　of　mutual　welfare　and　profit　and　together　with　these　receive　peace
　　tranquility，　happiness　and　good　fortune．　Can　this　be　compared　to　some　kind　of　competi－
　　tion　between　strong　and　weak，　superior　and　inferior？If　all　men　fear　the　order　of　Heaven
　　（tenmei）as　they　should　if　they　work　with　on　honest　heart　and　good　will，　if　one　man　is
　　like　this，　then　one　house　is　like　this，　then　one　country　is　like　this，　and　then　all　the　realms
　　under　Heaven　are　like　this，　illuminated　by　love　and　fanned　by　the　winds　of　benevolence，
　　The　four　sea　will　meet　in　happiness，　harmony　will　drift　into　the　hearts　of　all，　and　good
　　fortune　will　be　visited　on　everyone．
（9）Sumiyoshi　Y．　Meiji　shoki　ni　okeru　kokusaiho　no　d6nyu（The　lntroduction　of　the　Law
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　37
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meiji　Law　Journal
　　of．Nations　into　Japan　during　the　Early　Meiji　period）．　Kokusaih6　Gaik6　Zasshi，　No．71，
　　vol．5・6．
（10）Joseph　Pittau，　Political　Thought　in　Early　Meiji　Japan，1967，11．
（lD　Jhon　Peter　Stern，　op．　cit．，70，　Sumiyoshi　Y．，　Sei6　kokusai　hogaku　no　Nihon　eno　D6nyu
　　（Japanese　introduction　of　the　western　international　law），　Horitsu　Ronso，　Vol．42，　No．4．
　　5．6．
（12）Gaimush6　Ch6sabu，　DaiNihon　Gaiko　bunsho（Diplomatic　Documents　of　Greater
　　Japan）No．1，　voL　1，227－8．
（13）P．J．　Treat，　Diplomatic　relations　between　the　United　States　and　Japan，（Stanford，
　　1932），311．
（14）Gaimush6　DaiNihon　Gaiko　bunsho，　vol．1，　No．1，565．“It　gave　the　yOung　Emperor，　who
　　was　receiving　Europeans　for　the　first　time，　not　only　in　his　own　life　but　in　all　the　long
　　history　of　his　dynasty，　and　whose　mind　was　no　doubt　full　of　curiosity，　an　oppotunity　for
　　expressing　with　the　sympathetic　tact　and　dignity　which　characterized　him　in　after　life，
　　his　regret　at　what　had　happened　and　of　manifesting　his　desire　to　prevent　its　recurrence．
　　Hitherto　every　samurai（soldier）who　murdered　a　European　thought　that　he　was　perfor－
．ming　a　SerViCe　tO　hiS　gOdS，　hiS　EmperOr　and　hiS　COUntry．　If　he　WaS　brOUght　tO　jUStiCe　and
　　had　to　pay　the　penalty　of　his　act，　both　law　and　custom　permitted　him　to　be　his　own
　　executioner　and　find　death　in　a　way　that　brougt　no　dishonour　on　either　him　or　his
　　relatives，　which　was　in　fact　the　consummation　of　martyrdom”J．　H．　Longford，　The
　　Evolution　of　New　Japan，1913，32－33．
（15）The　last　clause　involved　not　only　social　degredation　to　the　offender　and　his　family，
　　but　humiliating　death　to　the　former　at　the　hands　of　the　public　executioner．　Thence
　　forward　the　murder　of　a　foreigner　lost　the　character　of　a　martyr　and　became　a　common
　　criminal　like　any　robber　or　thief．　From　that　day　outrages　of　this　nature　entirely　ceased．
　　Europeans　have，　it　is　true，　since　been　murdered　by　native　in　Japan，　but　these　have　been
　　cases　of　sordid　crime　such　as　occur　in　any　country，　and　in　none　were　the　murderers
　　actuated　solely　by　political　or　religious　motives．
（16）Gaimsh6，　Dainihon　Gaiko　bunsho，　vo1．1，　No．1，348－350，　Shimomura　Fujio，　Meiji　ishin
　　－no　Gaiko（Diplomacy　of　Meiji　Restration），35．
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　　　　　　　　State　Practices　and　Interpretation　of　International　Law　in　Early　Japan（1865－），　II
（17）Kido　Koin，　Nihon　shiseki　kyokai　ed．，　Kido　K6in　Nikki（Diary　of　Kido　K6in）voL　1，138．
（18）Gaimsh6，　Dainihon　Gaiko　bunsho，　J6yaku　kaisei　kankei（Diplomatic　Documents
　　relating　to　Treaties　Revision　of　Iwakura　Mission），　vol．1，　No．2，14．
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　　important　works　are　F．　C．
　　Dickins，　The　Life　of　Sir　Harry　Parkes，　vol．2，（London，1894）and　P．　J．　Treat，　op．　cit．，　note
　　13．
（28）The　three　occasions　were　the　postponement　of　the　opening　of　Niigata　at　the　end　of
　　1859，the　postponement　of　opening　of　Edo，　Osaka，　Hyogo，　and　Nigata　in　1862，　and　the
　　1866Tariff　Convention．
lbid．，　vol．1，　No．3，3．
ibid．，　vol．1，　No．4．
ibid．，　voL　1，　No．5．
ibid．，　vol．1，　No．11．
ibid．，　voL　1，　No．12．
ibid．，　vol．1，　No．23．
ibid．，　vol．1，　No．26．
Okubo　to　Dajδkan，120ctober　1871，　Dainihon　Gaik6　bunsho，　vol．1，　No．4，64．
There　are　very　few　studies　of　Treaty　Revision　in　Western　languages．　The　three　most
　　　　　　　　　 　　　　　 　　　　　Jones，　Extraterritoriality　in　Japan（New　Haven，1931），　F．　V．
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